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NOTES

LABOR LAW-The Permissible Scope of the National Labor
Relations Board's Rule Against Relitigation
Under section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
Act),1 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is
charged with the responsibility of determining what group of employees constitutes an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining with an employer. While the Board itself originally handled
representation petitions and determined appropriate bargaining
units, Congress in 1959 amended the NLRA and authorized the
Board to delegate its section 9 powers to the regional directors in
order to expedite NLRB operations.2 Pursuant to this authorization,
and in accordance with its rule-making authority under section 6 of
the Act, 8 the Board issued a series of rules and regulations to govern
the regional directors in the exercise of their delegated responsibilities.4 In order to effectuate the expeditious resolution of representation issues, rule 102.67 (f) established what has become known as the
Board's "rule against relitigation." 5 Through application of this rule,
certain issues that are decided by regional directors in representation
proceedings under section 9-and that are subsequently affirmed
either by the Board's denial of a request for review 6 or by the failure
of the aggrieved party to seek such review-are foreclosed from
Board consideration in subsequent related unfair labor practice proceedings co!lducted under section 10 of the Act.7 The effect of this
1. 29 U.S.C. § I59(b) (1964).
2. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 [hereinafter
LMRDA], Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 70I(b), 73 Stat. 542, amended § 3(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA], codified in 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964), to
provide in part:
• • • The Board is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers
under section 159 of this title to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose
of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine
whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a
secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 159 of this title and certify the
results thereof, except that upon the filing of a request therefor with the Board
by any interested person, the Board may review any action of a regional director
delegated to him under this paragraph, but such a review shall not, unless
specifically ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of any action taken by the
regional director••••
3. 29 u.s.c. § 156 (1964).
4. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60•.72 (1970).
5. 29 C,F.R. § 102.67(£) (1970) provides:
The parties may, at any time, waive their right to request review. Failure to
request review shall preclude such parties from relitigating, in any related subsequent unfair labor practice proceedmg, any issue which was, or could have been,
raised in the representation proceeding. Denial of a request for review shall
constitute an aflirmance of the regional director's action which shall also preclude
relitigating any such issues in any related subsequent unfair labor practice
proceeding.
6. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2l(d) (1970).
7. NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964), empowers the National Labor Relations Board
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rule is to relieve the Board of its statutory function of determining
the existence or absence of unfair labor practices.8 This res judicata
feature of the rule against relitigation has produced a conflict in recent
decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits
in NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Company 9 and Pepsi-Cola Buffalo
Bottling Company v. NLRB. 10 These cases reflect a fundamental
perceptual difference concerning the congressional purpose behind
(NLRB or Board) to determine and remedy unfair labor practices, which are defined
in § 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). The proscribed activity most germane to
this Note involves an employer's refusal to bargain with a union that has been
certified as the representative of a group of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining after winning an election that was directed by an NLRB regional director.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). See text accompanying notes 12-23 infra. The problem
dealt with in this Note results from the manner in which the rule against relitigation
has been generally applied. Although the rule could arguably be applied to collateralestoppel situations-i.e., cases in which the unfair labor practice is not directly related
to the prior § 9 determination-the actual operational parameters of the rule are
significantly narrower than the broad language of rule 102.67(£) might indicate. Court
and NLRB invocations of the rule have heretofore confined its importance to res
judicata situations, where the refusals to bargain have arisen as a direct result of prior
representation proceedings. For example, in NLRB v. Union Bros., Inc., 403 F.2d 883,
887 n.8 (4th Cir. 1968), the court noted: "Application of the board's rule, § 102.67(£)
[29 C.F.R. § 102.67(£) (1970)), prohibiting relitigation of issues decided in representation
proceedings has not been sanctioned when an unfair labor practice, other than a refusal
to bargain, is charged." See also Leonard Niederriter Co., 130 NL.R.B. 113, 115 (1961),
in which the Board noted that findings in an earlier representation proceeding did
not conclusively settle a status question in a § IO case when the later unfair labor
practice dispute stemmed from something other than a refusal to bargain based upon
disagreement with the prior § 9 decision; and Amalgamated Clothing Workers v,
NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 903-05 (D.C. Cir. 1966), discussed in text accompanying notes
105-07 infra.
8. NLRA § IO(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964), provides in part:
••• If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact
and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice .••• If • • • the Board
shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged
in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its
findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. , ••
See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9-.59 (1970).
9. 427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 39 U.SL.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No.
370).
10. 409 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
For an earlier decision dealing with the controversial policies behind the rule, see
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 158 (1941), discussed in note 108
infra.
A major source of dissatisfaction with the rule has been the lack of a right to
judicial review of a regional director's decision unless a petition is filed pursuant to
§§ 9(d) and l0(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(d), 160(e) (1964), for review or enforcement of a bargaining order based on a finding of a § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964),
violation arising from a refusal to bargain by the aggrieved employer. See Boire v.
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); American Fedn. of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S.
401 (1940). The § 8(a)(5) route has become the accepted method of challenging such
representation determinations. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964);
NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Co., 427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 39 U.SL.W.
3146 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 370).
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the 1959 delegation authorization, the use of the rule against relitigation to effectuate that purpose, and the propriety of the rule's effect
on unfair labor practice proceedings under section 10.11
In Pepsi, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals announced a restrictive view of the permissible use of the rule
against relitigation.12 The problem in Pepsi involved a union attempt to gain recognition as the bargaining representative for a
bottling company's employees.13 In order to deliver its products
throughout the market region, the company used a system of fiftyfour "distributors"-individuals who owned or leased trucks and
carried the soft drinks to various retail stores.14 The union's petition
for certification included these individuals in the proposed bargaining unit. Pepsi-Cola challenged the petition on the ground that the
distributors were independent contractors and consequently ineligible for inclusion in the employee unit.15 Following a representation hearing, the acting regional director decided that the fifty-four
distributors were employees of the company for purposes of the
NLRA, and ordered a representation election covering the unit that
included the challenged individuals.16 Pepsi-Cola disputed the regional director's decision and petitioned for NLRB review.17 The
Board dismissed the petition on the ground that the issues raised
were not sufficiently substantial to warrant review.18 After the union
won the election and was certified by the Board as the exclusive bargaining representative for Pepsi-Cola's employees, the company continued to contest the decisions on the status of its distributors and
sought reconsideration of that issue by refusing to bargain with the
union. As anticipated, the employer was charged with an unfair labor
practice consisting of an unlawful refusal to bargain in violation of
11. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). See note 7 supra.
12. 409 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1969).
13. 409 F.2d at 677. The union involved was District 50, United Mine Workers of
America.
14. 409 F.2d at 677.
15. 409 F.2d at 678. "Independent contractors" are not included within the definition
of "employee" for purposes of the NLRA. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
16. 409 F.2d at 678.
17. 409 F.2d at 678. Requirements for the granting of review of a regional director's
decision are defined in Board rules 102.67(b), (c), and (d), 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67(b), (c), (d)
(1970). Subsection (b) requires that the request be filed within ten days after the service
of the regional director's d~cision. Subsection (c) provides that the Board will grant
review only when one or more of the following compelling reasons exist: (I) a substantial question of law or policy raised by the absence of or departure from official
Board precedent; (2) a clearly erroneous decision on the facts; (3) misconduct of the
hearing resulting in prejudicial error; (4) compelling reasons for reconsideration of a
Board rule or policy. Subsection (d) requires that the request contain summaries of
evidence and argument sufficient to allow the Board to make a ruling without actual
recourse to the record,
18. 409 F.2d at 678.
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section 8(a)(5) of the Act.19 In responding to the complaint, the company conceded the refusal to bargain, but claimed that it was entitled
to further hearings on the inclusion of the distributors in the bargaining unit. In the ensuing unfair labor practice hearing, the General Counsel for the NLRB moved for summary judgment against
Pepsi-Cola.2° Citing the rule against relitigation, he argued that the
regional director's decision on the issue of distributors' status was
final, that the Board's previous denial of review constituted affirmance of the decision, and that the regional director's decision was
therefore res judicata on the issue for purposes of the unfair labor
practice hearing. 21 The trial examiner agreed with the General
Counsel, and hence granted the motion for summary judgment and
ordered the company to bargain with the union. 22 Following Board
affirmance, Pepsi-Cola petitioned the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for relief.23
The court perceived the issue before it in terms of administrative
convenience and congressional intent: "We are thus called upon to
reconcile the Board's need to keep its house in an efficient manner
by standards it believes will achieve that end with a litigant's right
to have his case adjudicated by the persons Congress has chosen to
make final decisions in labor cases."24 Feeling that the latter consideration deserved to be accorded more weight than the former, the
court remanded the case for further Board proceedings concerning
the status of the distributors. 25 It held that in unfair labor practice
proceedings that are related to section 9 determinations the Board
must at least review the record before the regional director on such
issues as employee status: "we seek only to insure that, before taking
the serious step of declaring that an employer has committed an unfair labor practice, the Board will simply review the record before the
Regional Director to determine whether his decision was correct, and
not merely whether it was clearly erroneous.''26
Essentially, the court's criticism was directed at the Board's
procedure and standards for reviewing or not reviewing regionaldirector decisions and the resulting res judicata effect of unreviewed decisions in subsequent related unfair labor practice cases.
This Board procedure was deemed unacceptable because it merely
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
20. 409 F.2d at 679.
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9-.59 (1970) for the procedure
employed in preventing unfair labor practices.
22. 409 F.2d at 679.
23. 409 F.2d at 679. Any person who believes himself aggrieved by a final order
of the Board may seek review of such order in an appropriate United States court
of appeals. NLRA § 10(£), 29 U.S.C. § 160(£) (1964).
24. 409 F.2d at 679.
25. 409 F .2d at 682.
26. 409 F.2d at 681.
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gave "rubber-stamped" approval of such decisions, and thereby permitted regional directors to decide unfair labor practice cases despite
Congress' intention that the Board should make such decisions. 27 The
court stated:
The Board seeks to use the rule against relitigation to carve out an
exception for unfair labor practices that happen to arise in the
context of a representation dispute, though conceding that if this
unfair labor proceeding arose independently of the representation
dispute the petitioner would have been entitled to full review by
the Board of the Hearing Examiner's findings of fact and conclusion
of law. 28
Although not requiring a de novo hearing on the issues delegated to
the regional director, the court indicated that the rule against relitigation improperly relieves the Board of its statutory responsibilities
when a representation issue is "difficult and requires a fine-drawn
balancing of facts and law.'' 29 In support of this position, the court
emphasized that the Board's "experience is particularly relevant and
desirable in deciding complex [representation] issues ... before the
potent sanctions arising from the finding of an unfair labor practice
are invoked." 30 While the court provided no definitive standards
concerning the required extent of Board review of regional-director
dedsions, 31 it clearly held that at least in situations similar to that
in Pepsi the Board cannot confer res judicata effect-:--as contemplated
by the rule against relitigation--on representation decisions originally reviewed under the "substantial question," "clearly erroneous," "prejudicial error," and "compelling reason" criteria established
by subsection (c) of Board rule 102.67.32
The controlling factor in the Pepsi decision was the perceived
effect of the rule against relitigation on the congressional policy,
manifested in section 10 of the NLRA, that the Board determine the
existence of unfair labor practices. Although the court recognized
27. 409 F.2d at 679. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
28. 409 F.2d at 680.
29. 409 F.2d at 679.
l!0. 409 F.2d at 680. Regarding difficulties encountered in determining independentcontractor questions, see Adelstein 8e Edwards, The Resurrection of NLRB v. Hearst:
Independent Contractors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 17 KAN. L. REY.
191 (1969).
l!l. Language in the Pepsi opinion would seem to indicate that the Board must
independently redecide a representation issue whenever such issue subsequently affects
an unfair labor practice determination. The court commented that the 1959 delegation
of authority was to be "subject to the safeguard of plenary review by the Board at the
unfair labor practice stage." 409 F.2d at 681 (emphasis added). "Plenary review" would
seem to indicate a system in which the agency gives full and complete reconsideration
to exceptions to regional-director decisions. However, the opinion does not discuss
specifically the nature and extent of such review.
!!2. See note 17 supra.
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that the 1959 amendment manifested a desire to hasten Board operations, 33 it emphasized repeatedly that the Board had been given the
responsibility for deciding unfair labor practice cases, and that it is
improper to use a rule that allows the Board's delegate in effect to
make such a decision.34 Aside from the actual language of section
10,35 the principal support for the court's conclusions was drawn
from Congress' rejection in 1961 of a proposal that would have permitted the delegation of the Board's unfair labor practice authority
to the regional clirectors.36 Equating the effect of the rejected proposal with the res judicata effect on unfair labor practice cases that
the rule against relitigation gave to regional-director decisions, the
court concluded that it was contrary to congressional policy to "authorize all hearing examiners [and by implication regional directors]
to render final, unreviewable decisions." 37 Viewing the rule as a mistaken implementation of the 1959 amendment,38 the court rejected
the practical operation of the rule, saying, "[w]e see no basis for thus
mutilating the legislative scheme. The consequences of committing
an unfair labor practice are the same no matter what the source of
the dispute." 39
The holding in Pepsi was further amplified and refined in subsequent circuit court cases, including one in which the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reconsidered the problem.40 Three cases decided
outside the Second Circuit dealt with the Pepsi issue in dicta. In
NLRB v. Chelsea Clock Company,41 a case decided on grounds independent of the Pepsi rationale, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
cited Pepsi as authority for the proposition that the Board cannot
delegate to regional directors the authority to render "ultimate
decisions" in unfair labor practice cases.42 In State Farm Mutual
33. 409 F .2d at 681.
34. 409 F.2d at 679-81.
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) (set out in pertinent part in note 8 supra); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
36. 409 F.2d at 681. For a discussion of this proposal, see Auerbach, Scope of
Authority of Federal Administrative Agencies To Delegate Decision Making to Hearing
Examiners, 48 MINN. L. REv. 823, 865 (1964). In essence, the proposal would have
allowed Board agents-hearing officers or trial examiners--to render final decisions
in § 10 cases subject only to discretionary review by the Board. Auerbach included a
complete documentation of the legislative history of the proposal. Id. at 839-40 n.61.
37. 409 F.2d at 681.
38. The 1959 amendment to NLRA § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964), is set out in
note 2 supra and discussed in the text accompanying notes 2-8 supra.
39. 409 F.2d at 680.
40. NLRB v. Olson Bodies, Inc., 420 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 38
U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. June 9, 1970) (No. 1670, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 238, 1970
Term). See notes 51-57 infra and accompanying text.
41. 411 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1969).
42. 411 F.2d at 192.
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Automobile Insurance Company v. NLRB 43 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals also interpreted the Pepsi decision. Although that
case, which involved a dispute over an employee's status, was also
decided on non-Pepsi grounds, 44 the court rendered an interesting
construction of the Pepsi doctrine: "In Pepsi-Cola the court held
that the Board failed to perform its statutory function of independently determining the 'crucial issue'-whether Pepsi-Cola's distributors were employees."45 Similarly, in NLRB v. Clement-Blythe
Companies, 46 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals read Pepsi as
requiring a Board determination of underlying representation issues
in related unfair labor practice cases. That court reversed the Board
because of the Board's failure to follow the requirements of section 8
of the Administrative Procedure Act47 by not providing the required
statement of findings and conclusions when ruling that the company
had committed an unfair labor practice.48 Although the court in
dictum interpreted the Pepsi decision as not requiring the NLRB to
conduct a de novo hearing at the unfair labor practice stage on a
representation issue previously decided by a regional director, it did
say that in such cases "the Board must thoroughly review the record
before the Regional Director and make its own decision." 49 Thus,
the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals apparently feel
that the NLRB has a broad duty to review extensively the factual
and legal basis of a previously unreviewed regional director's representation decision when it arises in a subsequent related unfair labor
practice proceeding.
Neither the Pepsi decision nor any of the three subsequent cases
discussed above specified the exact extent of Board review that is required in unfair labor practice proceedings that are related to a
representation issue previously decided by a regional director in a
section 9 hearing. However, all four decisions stressed the desirability
of having the Board independently redetermine the underlying
representation issue. Hence, these cases may be read as negating the
delegation of section 9 authority to some extent, and they virtually
nullify the application of the rule against relitigation. The con43. 413 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
44. In State Farm, contrary to the situation present in Pepsi, the representation case
had been transferred to the Board during the § 9 proceeding for resolution by it,
thereby rendering application of the rule against relitigation clearly proper in the
subsequent § 8(a)(5) proceeding since it would be useless for the Board to reconsider
its own determination. 413 F.2d at 949. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 3l!l
U.S. 146, 158 (1941).
45. 413 F.2d at 949 (emphasis added).
46. 415 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1969).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (1964).
48. 415 F.2d at 82.
49. 415 F.2d at 82 (emphasis added).
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gressional policy underlying section IO of having the NLRB make
final decisions in unfair labor practice cases seems to have been the
predominant consideration for these courts. However, the similarly
important legislative purpose of expediting Board operations, as
manifested in the 1959 amendment to section 3 of the NLRA, 150 was
at least partially recognized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
itself in the recent case of NLRB v. Olson Bodies, Incorporated, 151
which modified the strict language found in the Pepsi opinion.152
The Olson case, which evolved through the familiar Pepsi procedure, 53 concerned the propriety of a previous unreviewed regionaldirector determination that a certain challenged individual held a
supervisory position and was therefore ineligible to vote in a representation election. 154 Following a summary judgment by the Board
on the section 8(a)(5) complaint, the company appealed to the Second
Circuit on the basis of Pepsi and sought remand of the case to the
Board for a full determination of the status question. 55 The court
denied the requested relief and held that Pepsi did not govern the
situation. Writing for the court, Judge Friendly interpreted the
Pepsi language in a restrictive light:
Accepting Pepsi-Cola we do not regard it as making remand
automatic whenever the Board has declined to review a decision of
a regional director under powers delegated to him pursuant to § 3(b).
This court was there dealing with an issue, whether distributors
were employees or independent contractors, which, as the Board
conceded, "is difficult and requires a fine-drawn balancing of facts
and law" •.•.r;a

Since the court believed that a relatively simple employee status question was involved in Olson, it concluded that the Board had properly
50. LMRDA § 70I(b), Pub. L. No. 86·257, § 70I(b), 73 Stat. 542, amending NLRA
3(b), codified in 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964). See note 2 and text accompanying notes
2-8 supra.
51. 420 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. June 9,
1970) (No. 1670, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 238, 1970 Term). It should be
noted that the Pepsi and Olson cases were decided by different three-judge panels
in the Second Circuit: Pepsi was decided by a panel consisting of Chief Judge
Lumbard, and Circuit Judges Smith and Kaufman; Olson was decided by a panel
consisting of Circuit Judges Friendly, Smith, and Feinberg.
52, See text accompanying notes 28 8e 39 supra.
53. The procedural steps and strategy that led to the Pepsi decision (see 409 F.2d
at 677-79, and text accompanying notes 13-23 supra) were largely duplicated in the
first cases of the Pepsi generation (see notes 41-49 supra and accompanying text), and
are found in Olson (427 F.2d at 116). See also text accompanying notes 62-65 infra.
54. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11) (1964).
55. 420 F.2d at 1188-89.
56. 420 F.2d at 1190 quoting Pepsi at 409 F.2d at 679. Although Judge Friendly did
not fully discuss the point, his opinion criticized the Pepsi court's prior analysis and
treatment of the 1959 amendment. 420 F.2d at 1190.
§
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incorporated the prior regional-director determination in the unfair
labor practice case.117
Although Olson represented a partial retreat from the Pepsi doctrine, it did not fully restore the Board's rule against relitigation.
Nevertheless, the NLRB has continued to adhere to its rule. This
perseverance was recently rewarded in NLRB v. Magnesium Casting
Company, 58 in which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit completely repudiated the Pepsi doctrine. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in Magnesium Casting to resolve this conflict between the First and Second Circuits.59
The crucial representation issue involved in Magnesium Casting
concerned the voting status of seven workers who were employed as
assistant foremen. The company contended that the men were ineligible supervisory personnel. 60 The regional director, however,
ruled that six of the seven assistant foremen were employees rather
than supervisors, and he therefore included them in the proposed bargaining unit. 61 The company's petition for review of the decision
was denied. 62 Following a union election victory, the company sought
to reopen the issue by refusing to bargain, and the Pepsi procedural
pattern once again unfolded. The NLRB followed its usual practice
and summarily issued a bargaining order. 63 After denying the company's request for reconsideration, 64 the Board petitioned the First
Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of its bargaining order.65
The court succinctly formulated the issue as "whether the National
Labor Relations Board must make its own findings of fact before it
can conclude that a Company has committed an unfair labor practice
by its admitted refusal to bargain." 66 The court felt that the Pepsi
holding definitely eliminated that part of the rule against relitigation
that allowed the Board summarily to find a section 8(a)(5) violation
without independently deciding the representation issue that originally prompted the refusal to bargain.67 Although recognizing that
57. 420 F.2d at 1190.
58. 427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No.
370).
59. 39 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 370).
60. 427 F.2d at 116. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152 (11) (1964).
61. 427 F.2d at 116.
62. 427 F.2d at 116.
63. 427 F.2d at 116.
64. 427 F.2d at 116. Motions for reconsideration after a Board decision due to
"extraordinary circumstances" are authorized by the Board's procedural rules. 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.48(d) (1970).
65. 427 F.2d at 116.
66. 427 F.2d at 118.
67. 427 F.2d at 118-19.
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it had previously indicated acceptance of the Pepsi doctrine in
NLRB v. Chelsea Clock Company, 68 the court decided to reject completely both the Pepsi doctrine and the Olson modification. 69
The court analyzed the Pepsi problem almost exclusively in terms
of the history and policy behind the 1959 amendment to section 3 of
the Act. It acknowledged and then discounted the reasoning behind
the Pepsi holding:
Viewing the problem as tabula rasa, there may be some merit to
the proposition that discretionary review by the Board is not a
sufficient guarantee of the exercise of the expertise attributed to the
Board; that section IO(c) of the Act requires the Board to make its
own determinations of fact in unfair labor practice cases ..• ; and
that Congressional rejection of proposals to delegate final authority
to hearing examiners suggests a similar reluctance to delegate such
authority to Regional Directors....
But the slate was etched rather clearly, we think, when Congress
amended section 3(b) of the Act 29 U.S.C. § 153(b ), in 1959.70
Contrary to the Second Circuit's position in Pepsi, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals believed that this amendment was designed to permit regional directors to make decisions with final effect.71 It concluded that the delegation provision indicated a congressional willingness to allow the Board to authorize delegates to act in its place.72
This equation of Board and delegate authority led the court to
reject the company's contention, based on the Pepsi holding, that
the 1959 amendment on its face limits the regional directors to the
exercise of section 9 powers and thus leaves determination of unfair
labor practice issues solely to the Board under section 10. The court
noted that it is well established that the Board is not required to
reconsider issues decided by it in section 9 proceedings when they
arise in related subsequent unfair labor practice cases.73 It therefore
reasoned that a decision by a regional director acting in the Board's
stead under the authority of the section 3(b) delegation should be afforded the same effect in a subsequent unfair labor practice case,
even when Board review is denied. 74
68. 411 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
69. 427 F.2d at 119.
70. 427 F.2d at 119 {emphasis added).
71. A regional director's "determination-when not set aside by the :Board-is
entitled to the same weight in the subsequent proceeding that the :Board's own
determination would have been accorded." 427 F.2d at 119.
72. 427 F.2d at 119.
73. 427 F.2d at 119. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941).
74. 427 F.2d at 119. See also Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLR:B, 365 F.2d
898, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which the court noted that the practical effect of the rule
against relitigation was to carry over "the earlier :Board practice precluding relitigation
in a 'related' unfair labor practice hearing of an issue determined in a representation
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In the eyes of the First Circuit, this conclusion was supported by
the legislative history of the 1959 amendment.75 From the court's
analysis of that history, it drew two important conclusions: first, the
amendment reflects a congressional judgment that regional directors
possess sufficient ability with respect to representation issues that the
Board's expertise need be exercised only through a narrow discretionary review; and second, the primary purpose of the amendment was to expedite final resolution of representation questions.76
The court reasoned that implementation of these congressional policies was most fully accomplished through complete operation of the
Board's rule against relitigation: "Thus, while the Company's interpretation-based on Pepsi-Cola-would expedite only elections and
certification but not the disposition of the issues resolved therein,
the Board's interpretation makes it unnecessary to redetermine each
of those issues [in subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings],
thereby effectuating the Congressional purpose more completely."77
It is apparent that the Pepsi, Olson, and Magnesium Casting
courts had disparate conceptions of the congressional desires manifested in the enactment of the pertinent provisions of the NLRA.
Although each court utilized a rationale founded upon interpretations of the same legislative histories-concerning sections 3 and IO of
the NLRA-in order to support its conclusions, they reached widely
divergent results. It may be instructive to examine afresh those legislative histories and to determine the relevant congressional considerations; an attempt may then be made to accommodate the opposing
policies involved with the Board's application of its rule against
relitigation.
It is clear from the legislative history that surrounded the passage
of sections 9 and IO of the original NLRA that Congress intended
that the Board make the ultimate agency determinations in all representation and unfair labor practice cases. 78 Congress recognized the
inherent difficulties present during the formative years of an innovative administrative scheme and desired that the NLRB develop a uniform body of labor law through the exercise of its
particular expertise.79 However, important developments that ochearing, even though now the representation determination may have been made by
the Regional Director." This case is discussed in text accompanying notes 105-07 infra.
75. The legislative history is discussed in text accompanying notes 83-96 infra.
76. 427 F.2d at 120.
77. 427 F.2d at 120.
78. See 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Ac:r
2233, 2352, 3222 (1935).
79. 105 CONG. R.Ec. 8873 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Kearns), in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING 8: DISCLOSURE Ac:r OF 1959, 1749-50
(1959) [hereinafter l.EGIS. HIST. LMRDA].
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curred over the twenty-four years following passage of the NLRA80
indicated to Congress that it was no longer necessary or desirable to
reqmre the Board itself to determine all representation and unfair
labor practice cases. 81 These developments culminated in the 1959
amendment that was incorporated into section 3(b),82 and which
gave rise to the Pepsi problem.
An examination of the legislative history behind the 1959 amendment83 reveals that while the amendment to section 3(b) of the
.NLRA received substantial congressional attention in some respects,
there was no direct consideration of the potential effect of that
amendment on section 10. The concern that first prompted Congress
to consider the delegation authorization was the Board's increasingly heavy workload of representation and unfair labor practice
cases. This excessive caseload led the Board to refuse to exercise the
full scope of its jurisdiction and thereby to create the "no-man's
land" problem.84 The no-man's land consisted of those disputes over
which the Board possessed exclusive jurisdiction-thus pre-empting
state jurisdiction-but over which the Board refused to assert jurisdiction in order to reduce its caseload, on the ground of their insubstantial effect on commerce. 85 The first appearance of the section
3(b) amendment was in a draft bill introduced by Representative
Kearns of Pennsylvania. 86 H.R. 8342, the House committee's bill,
80. Perhaps the most significant development was the accumulation of a substantial
body of precedent based on actual NLRB experience in deciding representation and
other labor problems. The compilation of such precedent in the NLRB's own reports
and the establishment of uniform rules on procedure and decision-making based on
actual Board experience made it reasonable in most representation and unfair labor
practice cases for the Board to rely upon the determination of its delegates, since it
could generally be confident that such agents were applying the relevant law. See
notes 89-90 infra and accompanying text. Another development prompting the
change in congressional opinion was the size of the Board's caseload and the emergence
of the "no-man's land" problem. See notes 84-85 infra and accompanying text.
81. 105 CoNG. REc. 8873 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Kearns), in 2 LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA
1749-50.
82. See note 2 supra.
83. The 1959 amendment to NLRA § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964), is set out in
note 2 supra and discussed in the text accompanying notes 2-8 supra,
84. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1959), in 1 LEGis. HIST. LMRDA
775.
85. The Supreme Court held in Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1956), that
the Board possessed exclusive jurisdiction over all labor problems that affect commerce.
The practical effect of Guss and the Board's policy of refusing to exercise jurisdiction
over cases it felt lacked an appreciable effect on commerce was to exclude many small
employers and unions from the protection and services of the NLRB. Since state
agencies could not take jurisdiction, such excluded parties were left in a no-man's land
without a source of administrative or judicial remedy. The resolution of this
problem was an important factor in the development of the 1959 amendment that
authorized the delegation of § 9 powers. Congress also dealt with this problem by
amending § 14 of the NRLA to provide for the assumption of jurisdiction by state
agencies and courts over cases declined by the NLRB. LMRDA § 701(a), Pub. L. No.
86-257, § 70l(a), '73 Stat. 541, amending NLRA § 14, codified in 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2)
(1964).
86. H.R. 7265, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), in 1 LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA 591.
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included the identical provision,87 and the final draft contained
the amendment as originally proposed except for the addition of
three minor words of clarification. 88 Representative Kearns described his proposed amendment to section 3(b) as one of three
suggested changes designed to "increase the Board's capacity and
to provide faster processing of N.L.R.B. cases." 89 Recognizing that
in the early period of the NLRA's history it was necessary and desirable for the Board itself to handle representation cases, Kearns
emphasized that after twenty years of experience the rules of decision
were firmly established and that most representation cases were decided on precedent. He therefore felt that the handling of such
matters could safely and profitably be delegated to Board subordinates, thereby relieving the Board of primary responsibility over an
area that accounted for over half of its burgeoning workload. 90 The
House committee similarly emphasized the desirable expediting
effect that adoption of the proposed amendment would have on
Board operations, and it related this result to alleviation of the "noman's land" dilemma.91
The Senate was also cognizant of the problems exacerbated by
the increasing Board caseload, and initially sought a solution that
would have authorized the NLRB to utilize the services of state labor
agencies for the resolution of no-man's land cases.92 However, after
the introduction of the Kearns bill in the House, the Senate's attention shifted to the section 9 delegation concept as a means of generally lightening the Board's workload while improving its efliciency.93 Subsequent Senate consideration tended to focus primarily
on the expediting effect the House proposal would have on Board
operations and only secondarily on its effect on the "no-man's land"
problem. Thus, Senator Dirksen pointed out that the delegation of
power would result in "more expeditious" handling of labor cases,94
87. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1959), in I I..EcIS. HIST. LMRDA 747.
88. LMRDA § 70I(b), Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 70l(b), 73 Stat. 542, amending NLRA
§ 3(b), codified in 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964). The words of clarification consisted of the
phrase, "of section 9," after the reference to the provisions for directing an election
and taking a secret ballot.
89. 105 CONG. REc. 8873-74 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Kearns), in 2 I..EG1s. Hisr.
LMRDA 1749-50. The other proposed changes were an increase in Board size to seven
members and delegation of purely administrative responsibilities to the Board's General
Counsel.
90. 105 CoNG. REc. 8873 (1959) (remarks of R.ep. Keams), in 2 I..EcIS. HIST. LMRDA
1749·50.
91. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1959), in 1 1..Ec1s. HIST. LMRDA
775. See notes 80 8: 85 supra.
92. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1959), in I I..EcIS. HIST. LMRDA 422.
93. 105 CONG. REc. 14,988 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), in 2 LEGIS. HIST.
LMRDA 825-26. It should be noted that Senator Morse was a member of the conference
committee that produced the final version of the LMRDA. 2 LECIS. HIST. LMRDA
1400.
94. 105 CoNG. REc. 17,918 (1959) (remarks of Senator Dirksen), in 2 I..EcIS. HIST.
LMRDA 1452.
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and Senator Goldwater said that the section 3(b) amendment was
"designed to expedite final disposition of cases by the Board, by
turning over part of its caseload to its regional directors for final
determination." 95 Similarly, the final House comment on this legislation stressed the amendment's expediting effect rather than the
jurisdictional considerations.96
As the legislative history therefore clearly indicates, the logical
and intended result of the delegation amendment was to allow the
regional directors to make final decisions on most representation
questions. While there was some congressional concern over possible
deviation from established Board practice or arbitrary action by
regional directors, the availability of discretionary review by the
Board under the amendment97 was believed to be a sufficient safeguard against such dangers. 98 Therefore, Congress clearly contemplated that except when the Board felt it necessary to review a
particular problem, regional-director decisions under section 9 would
be regarded as final. 99
This conclusion concerning section 3(b) does not, however,
provide a complete answer to the question presented by the decisions
construing the rule against relitigation in Pepsi, 0 Ison, and Magnesium Casting. The Board's application of the rule, as approved in
Magnesium Casting, 100 tends to negate the policy expressed in section 10 of the Act that the Board shall decide unfair labor practice
cases. It was this policy that concerned the Pepsi court.
Thus, neither Pepsi nor Magnesium Casting satisfactorily resolves
the rule-against-relitigation problem because both cases tend to
exaggerate the importance of one congressional policy at the expense
of another and to neglect the significance of the factual pattern involved. The failure of the Pepsi court lies in the stress it places on
the policy embodied in section IO(c) that the NLRB should make its
own determination of fact in unfair labor practice cases and the
95. 105 CONG. REc. A8522 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater), in
2 LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA 1856.
96. 105 CoNG. REc. 18,128 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Barden), in 2 LEGIS. Hisr. LMRDA
1714.
97. See NLRA § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964), set out in note 2 supra.
98. 105 CONG. REc. 18,153 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Barden), in 2 LEcrs. HIST. LMRDA
1812; 105 CONG. REc. 18,152 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Griffin), in 2 LEGIS. Hisr. LMRDA
1811; 105 CONG. R.Ec. 8873-74 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Kearns), in 2 LEcrs. Hisr. LMRDA
1749-50; 105 CONG. REc. A8522 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater),
in 2 LEGIS. Hisr. LMRDA 1856.
99. 105 CONG. REC. 14,988 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), in 2 LEGIS. HIST.
LMRDA 1327; 105 CoNG. REc. A8522 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater), in 2 LEGis. Hrsr. LMRDA 1856. That the regional director's decisions were to be
final subject only to discretionary review was evidenced, in the opinion of the Second
Circuit in Magnesium Casting, by exactly this concern over possible deviation from
established precedent. See 427 F.2d at 120 n.4.
100. 427 F.2d at 121.
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court's correlative disregard of the section 3 policy.101 Under the
Pepsi doctrine, any employer involved in a representation proceeding
can effectively negate the expediting purpose of the 1959 amendment since by refusing to bargain he can force a relitigation of
issues resolved by a regional director in a previous representation
proceeding and thus achieve substantial delay.102
However, the First Circuit's holding in Magnesium Casting is
subject to similar criticism because it advances the expediting goal
of the section 3(b) amendment at the expense of the section 10 policy.
In fact, language in that case, if taken literally, would permit the
Board to utilize the rule against relitigation in collateral-estoppel
situations when the subsequent section 10 case involves a matter
other than a refusal to bargain.103 For although the court mentioned
the prior Board practice regarding unfair labor practice cases arising
subsequent to a section 9 determination, it failed to stress that such
subsequent proceedings must be related to the original representation issue. 104 In Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 105 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the rule
against relitigation could not be applied in a section 10 case that
did not arise from an employer's refusal to bargain, in order to
challenge a regional director's section 9 determination.106 Thus, for
example, under the Amalgamated approach the rule against relitigation could be applied in a section 8(a)(5) case in which the employer
claimed that the regional director had improperly classified an individual as an "employee"; but it could not be applied in a section
8(a)(3) case in which the employer justified a discriminatory discharge
of an individual, whom the regional director had included in the
bargaining unit, on the ground that he was not an "employee."107
Under the Pepsi approach the rule against relitigation could not
be applied in either situation; the Magnesium Casting language, on
101, 427 F.2d at 121. The court's emphasis in Pepsi on Board determination of unfair
labor practices overlooks the practical aspects of the agency's operations. As recognized
by the Pepsi court, most § 10 disputes are resolved, not by the Board, but rather by
a trial examiner, whose decision is generally subjected to only pro forma review,
resulting in the Board's "rubber stamp acceptance" of his determination. 409 F.2d
at 679. In such situations, Board consideration of the underlying issues is probably
no more comprehensive than that afforded regional-director decisions in representation
cases. Thus, the Pepsi doctrine would not necesarily guarantee that substantially greater
Board attention would be given to representation issues in § 8(a)(5) cases.
102. See note 53 supra.
103, 427 F.2d at 119.
104. See note 7 supra.
105. ll65 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
106. ll65 F.2d at 904-05. See also NLRB v. Union Bros., Inc., 403 F.2d 883 (4th
Cir. 1968), and Leonard Niederriter Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 113 (1961), discussed in note
7 supra.
107. "Employee" is defined in NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964). Employees
are entitled to certain rights under NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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the other hand, would permit the rule to be applied in both cases.
While the Pepsi approach would interfere with the expeditious
handling of Board affairs, the Magnesium Casting approach would
enable regional directors to make final decisions that would be
binding on subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings that are
unrelated to representation controversies and hence that were not
anticipated at the time of the earlier determinations. It is the failure
of the courts to perceive properly the significance of the "related" requirement of the rule that makes both decisions unsatisfactory.108
Nevertheless, whenever the factual pattern of a case involves the
correct operational parameters of the rule, the Magnesium Casting
decision provides the preferable approach.109 It furthers the more
recently expressed congressional policy of expediting Board operations and, used in the allowable manner, effectively frustrates attempts to delay the resolution of representation problems. The
Pepsi approach, however, tends to promote delay since any representation dispute can be easily continued in a subsequent unfair
labor practice case by a mere refusal to bargain. Once a section 8(a)(5)
charge is filed, a dilatory party can successfully delay to the extent
of the time required for the Board to determine that the section 9
decision was correct and "not merely whether it was clearly erroneous."110 Even after being directed by a court of appeals to apply
this stiffer standard of review, it is highly probable that the Board,
having at least twice confirmed the prior decision, 111 would continue
to uphold its agent. Further delay would result if the problem were
again forced back to the courts by a continued employer refusal to
comply with the bargaining order. Thus, courts applying the Pepsi
doctrine may tend to aid those seeking such delay since, by virtue
of the remoteness of the Board's reversing its delegate on remand and
the party's obstinance, a judicial resolution of the representation
dispute will ultimately be required. Such delay, however, could be
prevented if the court would simply delete the intermediate remand
step and use the information contained in the record that is made
available to it under section 9(d) of the Act to resolve the issue.112
108. See note 7 supra. Substantial support for the current interpretation of the
"related" unfair labor practice requirement is found in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 158 (1941), in which the Supreme Court noted that a § 8(a)(5)
proceeding such as that in Pepsi is merely a continuation of the prior representation
dispute. Although this case long preceded the formal rule against relitigation, it
pertained to the prior decisional practice of the Board that accomplished the same
results.
109. See Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1970), in which
Magnesium Casting's interpretation of congressional policy was accepted.
110. Pepsi-Cola Buffalo Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 676, 676 (2d Cir. 1969).
111. The first affirmance occurs when § 9 review is denied, and the second when
the Board adopts the trial examiner's decision, which is based on summary acceptance
of the original regional-director determination.
112. See NLRA § 9(d), 29 U.S.C. § I59(d) (1964), which provides for the certification
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Despite the expediting policy of the 1959 amendments, the underlying policy of section IO is still valid to the extent that it requires
the Board to decide true unfair labor practice cases. The concern
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals over the NLRB's seeming
avoidance of this requirement through application of the rule against
relitigation may best be countered by the realization that cases like
Pepsi are actually only extended representation proceedings that Congress intended to allow regional directors to decide. In this respect,
the Olson case113-which actually nullifies Pepsi's effect on routine
representation problems-is a useful accommodation of the competing policies involved in sections 3 and 10. That is, Olson reminds
the Board that its discretionary power of review need only be exercised when novel and difficult representation problems arise for
which there is insufficient guiding precedent. Absent such rare circumstances, regional directors should be able to decide finally representation issues; when not reviewed, their determinations should,
through application of the rule against relitigation, govern in subsequent related unfair labor practice proceedings, such as those involved in Pepsi and Magnesium Casting.
of the entire Board record to the court on a review request. See Comment, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1184, 1189 n.28 (1969). See generally 1 NLRB, LEcrs. HIST. OF THE LABOR MANAGE•
MENT RELATIONS Acr oF 1947 (1947); NLRA §§ 9, 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1964).
11!1. See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text.

